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Abstract. This paper is mainly intended to provide some insights into the relationship 
between the aesthetic dimension, human practical/habitual knowledge and the envi-
ronment (broadly understood); more specifically, I shall shed some light on that vari-
ety of problems, issues and questions that arise when we examine role and functioning 
of our human aesthetic attitude – considered as an anthropological constant result of 
both biological evolution and cultural evolution and which involves, in its exercise, an 
intimate relationship between the organism and its environment – within the context 
of today’s environmental crisis.
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1. ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS
Although some developments of contemporary environmen-
tal aesthetics may be traced to the eighteenth century, to Kant and 
his notion of the sublime (see Brady [2003, 2013]; Pratt, Howarth, 
Brady [2000]), and to an unprecedented (at that time) interest in 
wild environments, untouched by human hand, it is however a mat-
ter of fact that what we call today environmental aesthetics formally 
emerged in the 70s and 80s of the past century in the Anglo-Ameri-
can world as a reaction against the exclusive focus on the arts within 
the analytically oriented tradition in aesthetics, as famously argued 
by Ronald Hepburn (1966) in his seminal essay Contemporary Aes-
thetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty. According to Hepburn, 
«although some important features of art-experience are unattain-
able in nature, that by no means entitles the aesthetician to confine 
his studies to art» (Hepburn [1966]: 285). In other words, there is a 
legitimate place in aesthetics for the appreciation of natural environ-
ments, broadly understood as «all objects that are not human arte-
facts» (Hepburn [1966]: 299).
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Allen Carlson, who – together with Ronald 
Hepburn and Malcolm Budd (see Carlson [2000], 
Budd [2002]) – has been one of the first propo-
nents of this new approach to aesthetics, devel-
oped in the 70s a “natural environmental model” 
of aesthetic appreciation that somehow extends 
the boundaries of Hepburn’s aesthetics of the nat-
ural world. According to Carlson, under the label 
environmental aesthetics we should understand 
the study of the aesthetic significance of our total 
surroundings (as opposed to that specific category 
of objects that are works of art), both natural and 
human-constructed: 
We appreciate not only art, but also nature – broad 
horizons, fiery sunsets, and towering mountains. 
Moreover, our appreciation reaches beyond pristine 
nature to our more mundane surroundings: the soli-
tude of a neighbourhood park on a rainy evening, the 
chaos of a bustling morning marketplace, the view 
from the road. Thus, there is a need for an aesthet-
ics of the environment, for in such cases our aesthetic 
appreciation encompasses our surroundings: our envi-
ronment. The environment may be more or less nat-
ural, large or small, mundane or exotic, but in each 
such case it is an environment that we appreciate. 
Such appreciation is the subject matter of environ-
mental aesthetics (Carlson [2000]: XII). 
Focusing on the aesthetic appreciation of any 
kind of environment, while stressing – like Hep-
burn and Budd – that aesthetics is by no means 
confined to art, Carlson’s environmental aesthet-
ics explicitly extends beyond the boundaries of 
Hepburn’s and Budd’s aesthetics of nature. Almost 
anything that is non-art can be a legitimate object 
of investigation for the environmental aesthet-
ics, in Carlson’s account: the natural world, in the 
first place, but also «cityscapes, neighbourhoods, 
market places, shopping centres, and beyond [...] 
every environment, natural, rural, or urban, large 
or small, ordinary or extraordinary, offers much to 
see, to hear, to feel, much to aesthetically appre-
ciate» (Carlson [2000]: XV). As has been noted, 
such an all-encompassing concept of “environ-
ment” might lead to the conclusion that «the label 
environmental aesthetics lacks theoretical bite» 
(Parsons [2012]: 235); over the decades, attempts 
have been made to determine more exactly rea-
sons, scopes and functioning of the human 
relationship to the (natural) environments, fre-
quently on an empirical-evolutionary basis. These 
attempts, however, remain controversial1. 
As ambiguous and vague as it may be, envi-
ronmental aesthetics – with the richness of all its 
different approaches and specifications – has had 
over the last decades the merit to lead within the 
Anglo-American philosophical tradition to the 
recognition of a mode of aesthetic experience that 
differs from the aesthetic experience of “standard” 
art, being complex, immersive and multisensory 
and addressing environments rather than iso-
lated objects. Moreover, it has allowed a critical 
response to the so-called “scenic model” of appre-
ciation of nature, according to which the natural 
world is experienced as if it were just like a pic-
torial image, a two-dimensional surface well set 
apart from the beholder (Brady [2017]: 204).
This paper is mainly intended to provide some 
insights into the relationship between aesthetics 
and the environment (a notion the precise mean-
ing of which, here, I will clarify in a while), to be 
understood more as preliminary notes for a future 
research programme rather than the result of a 
systematic and fully developed analysis. In a sense, 
then, it might be said that the argument I am 
going to sketch out here inscribes itself into the 
field of contemporary environmental aesthetics, 
although my perspective is not completely aligned 
neither with Hepburn’s aesthetics of nature (just to 
name one leading figure) nor with Carlson’s aes-
thetics of the total surroundings. In what follows, I 
move from three basic assumptions:
1. Aesthetics is always, qua talis, environmen-
tal aesthetics, since every aesthetic experience 
involves, per definition, the intimate perceptual 
1 Attempts to define and “measure” quantitatively the 
human relationship to the environment, through studies 
of preferential selection, have been made by psycholo-
gists, ecologists and evolutionary psychologists such as, 
for instance, the evolutionary ecologist G. Orians: see 
Orians (1980), (1986); Orians, Hervageen (1992).
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interaction between an organism and its environ-
ment, be it a natural environment or a human-
constructed one (or both). Inspired by Charles 
Darwin’s biological views, American philosopher 
John Dewey has notoriously regarded the live 
creature interacting with its environment as the 
starting point of all his philosophical investiga-
tions and, most notably, of his aesthetic theory. 
As known, in his Art as Experience (1934), Dewey 
understands the emergence and unfolding of aes-
thetic experiences in humans as strongly “rela-
tional” processes, the “consummation” or perfec-
tion – culmination or qualitative peak – of ordi-
nary experiences, which are always, by themselves, 
a matter of perceptual trade between the organism 
and its environment: «Experience is a matter of 
the interaction of organism with its environment, 
an environment that is human as well as physi-
cal, that includes the materials of tradition and 
institutions as well as local surroundings» (Dewey 
[1934]: 246). 
2. As argued by an impressive (and stead-
ily growing) body of inter-disciplinary studies 
over the last few years, Homo sapiens is, qua talis, 
Homo aestheticus (Dissanayake 1992): that means 
that that capacity to engage in aesthetic, highly 
significant and “consummatory” – although not 
necessarily pleasurable – relationships to the envi-
ronment, so vividly described by Dewey, is in 
humans a trans-cultural attitude. Each of us, as a 
member of the species Homo sapiens, is provided 
with a biological disposition to engage in aesthetic 
experiences that unfolds epigenetically over the 
individual’s lifetime and reaches its full develop-
ment in intimate interaction with the individual’s 
physical and socio-cultural environment (Desideri 
[2015]). 
3. According to Dewey, as already hinted, the 
environment with which the organism interacts 
and in relation to which the aesthetic experience 
happens is both physical and socio-cultural, “it 
includes the materials of tradition and institutions 
as well as local surroundings” (Dewey [1934]). 
In other words: not only does it encompass 
natural but also human-constructed settings, in 
such an intimate blend that each of them disap-
pears as a single unit. Few today would disagree 
that, compared with the time at which Dewey 
wrote his masterpiece, the most impressive fea-
ture of our contemporary global/local environ-
ment (almost 90% of which, all over the world, 
has been altered or heavily modified by humans, 
so that the natural element and the man-made 
element are very difficult to distinguish today, 
assuming that it does still make sense to dis-
tinguish between them) is that it is facing the 
greatest set of challenges the humanity has ever 
seen in terms of climate change, loss of biodiver-
sity, rates of extinction. That means, for the pur-
poses of the present paper: aesthetic experience 
is also today, as it was at Dewey’s time, a matter 
of interaction of an organism with its environ-
ment (both natural and socio-cultural), but an 
environment at risk. 
Summing up from what I have argued so far: 
throughout this paper the label environmental aes-
thetics refers to that variety of problems, issues 
and questions that arise when we examine role 
and functioning of our human aesthetic attitude 
– considered as an anthropological constant result 
of both biological evolution and cultural develop-
ment and which involves, in its exercise, an inti-
mate relationship between the organism and its 
environment – within the context of today’s envi-
ronmental crisis. 
In other words, environmental aesthetics falls 
here under the broader umbrella of the so-called 
Environmental Humanities, the recently emerged 
multidisciplinary matrix the main aim of which is 
to incorporate humanistic modes of inquiry into 
the discussion of current environmental change 
issues (Heise, Christensen, Niemann [2017]; 
Choné, Hajek, Hamman [2017]; Oppermann, 
Iovino [2017]; Adamson, Davis [2017]). Aesthet-
ics, like the humanities in general, is uniquely 
positioned to integrate the responses to environ-
mental issues given by the natural sciences, «by 
addressing the values which underpin environ-
mental decision-making» and by evaluating «the 
consequences of what are essentially problems of 
human interaction (with both the human and the 
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non-human worlds)»2. The last few years have wit-
nessed an increasing interest in environmentally 
oriented humanistic research, with a rapidly grow-
ing amount of publications, also by specialists in 
the field of aesthetics (Emily Brady, just to name 
one of the leading figures); several questions and 
issues, however, are still in need of elaboration 
and clarification. 
In order to start to address some of these 
issues, in the following paragraphs I go through 
two main steps: firstly, a (shorter) “diagnostic” 
step, which largely consists in reviewing some evi-
dences about the apparent inability of modern sci-
ence and modern scientific knowledge to mobilize 
intellectual and material resources for the environ-
ment; secondly, an “operative” step, asking which 
role might the aesthetic dimension (or the aesthet-
ic attitude, or the human trans-cultural capacity to 
engage aesthetic relationships with the world/envi-
ronment) and the arts have within the context of 
the current environmental crisis.  
2. NATURAL SCIENCES CANNOT DO IT ALONE
We are confronted today – this is the main 
thesis of a stimulating paper published in Decem-
ber 2015 (Holm et al. [2015]) – with the paralyz-
ing effects of (very well) knowing “the facts” about 
the environmental crisis (vividly and accurately 
described by the natural sciences), without being 
concretely able to deal with it and change direc-
tion. Why? Why does it seem there is no transi-
tion from “knowing that” environments are at risk 
to “knowing how” to change our environmental 
attitudes and behaviours? 
The paper suggests that the reason why science 
has not been able so far to shift human attitudes 
and really promote pro-environmental behaviours 
is that «at the heart of global change in the 21st 
century lie human choices and actions – questions 
of human behaviour, habits, motivation that are 
2 IASH, Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humani-
ties, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Environmental 
Humanities Network, online presentation: https://www.
iash.ed.ac.uk/environmental-humanities.
embedded in individual practices and actions, in 
institutional and cultural pathways, and in politi-
cal strategies» (Holm et al. [2015]: 980; see Rose 
et al. [2012]). To put it another way, the drive 
behind the current global environmental change 
seems not to have much to do, at least not in the 
first instance, with the crystalline logic of scientific 
facts – i.e., the world of data, discursive analyses, 
statistics, reports of warning that we can appreci-
ate through the lens provided by the “classical” 
Earth sciences (geology, biology, ecology, chemis-
try etc.). Rather, and to a greater extent, it has to 
do with the much more opaque logic of human 
practices, habits, bodies, institutions, choices – not 
always nor easily permeable through analytic scru-
tiny. Humanity, with its glorious and irreducible 
complexity, “fuels” the change: and «if humanity is 
indeed the force behind the changes on our plan-
et, then the humanities are called to explore the 
new directions ahead of us» (Wilke [2013]: 67). 
As an interdisciplinary field of research that 
brings together the social sciences, the humani-
ties and the natural sciences, the Environmental 
Humanities (philosophy, literature, history, theory 
of the arts, political theory, sociology, in coopera-
tion with biology, chemistry, physics, ecology) aim 
to respond to the «need to re-frame global envi-
ronmental change issues fundamentally as social 
and human challenges, rather than just environ-
mental issues» (Palsson et al. [2011]: 5). Interdis-
ciplinary scholars working in the field stress the 
inextricable nexus of man-made/”cultural” and 
“natural” components in the environment, a «per-
ceptual-cultural system that embraces person and 
place» (Berleant [1985]: 125), biotic and abiotic 
components. 
Where do the aesthetics and the arts fit in this 
context? This paper supports the idea that not 
only does the aesthetic dimension play a role, but 
also that it plays the most crucial role in the mul-
ti-faceted interaction between our natural/cultural 
environment “at risk” and us. 
In order to develop my argument, I firstly ana-
lyse the notion of practical knowledge (par. 3) as a 
fundamental requisite and resource for human life 
(both at the individual and at the collective lev-
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el) and I show in which sense and to what extent 
it can be said that the roots of human practical 
knowledge are aesthetic; secondly, I turn the spot-
light on habitual knowledge (including what may 
be called “human environmental habitual behav-
iour”) as a component – and one of the most valu-
able – of human practical knowledge (par. 4); final-
ly, I show how the aesthetic dimension and the arts 
are uniquely positioned to “grasp” the habitual/
practical layer of human experience and – conse-
quently – to pave the way for (possible) more sus-
tainable and pro-environmental behaviours.  
3. PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE 
In light of a vast amount of recent and less 
recent research in philosophy, anthropology, social 
psychology, cognitive sciences and sociology (Ryle 
[1946], Polanyi [1966]; Fodor [1968], Wulf et al. 
[2017]), it can be considered established that, 
both at the individual and at the collective-social 
level, what we call “practical knowledge” (tacit or 
latent knowledge, “know-how”, as distinguished 
from explicit knowledge or “know-that”) plays an 
important role. Processes of acquisition (mainly 
through mimetic behaviour) or of manifestation 
(through the use of a skill or ability) of such sort 
of embodied, pre-symbolic, procedural knowledge 
pervade the human life. Our everyday routine, 
both as individuals and as members of a commu-
nity, is steeped in activities such as knowing-how 
to «make good jokes, conduct battles or behave 
at funerals [...] cook omelettes, design dresses or 
persuade juries» (Ryle [1946]: 228), riding a bike, 
playing the piano, driving a car, which are all 
skills not immediately (or not at all) translatable 
into forms of propositional knowledge. I do not 
wish to go more deeply into this topic here, since 
it would lead us straight into the middle of a still-
hot debate, but let it suffice to say, for now, that a 
certain degree of “knowing-how” seems always to 
precede our “knowing-that”. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s legacy obviously plays, 
in this respect, a fundamental role: knowledge is 
an ability, according to the author of the Philo-
sophical Investigations (1953), and meaning is 
ultimately grounded in usage and practice, so 
that our most basic certainties, which make lan-
guage games possible, are non-propositional, 
rather enacted in our everyday practice. Among 
the major issues addressed in Wittgenstein’s Inves-
tigations there is the question as to how a human 
being can start to act according to rules (for 
instance, the rules of his/her social community). 
How is it possible? Rule-following cannot be for-
mally taught (since to teach someone how to fol-
low a particular rule R1 would require that the 
one we are teaching already knows how to follow 
the rule R2/ “When someone teach me R1, I have 
to follow it”, and so on and so forth); however, evi-
dence clearly testifies to the fact that children, for 
instance, are able to learn social regulations and 
rules even without formal teaching (Baker, Hacker 
[2009]; Gebauer [2009]). Rule-following is a prac-
tice, Wittgenstein argues; to be able to follow a 
rule is a competence, or practical knowledge. 
At the Interdisciplinary Centre for Histori-
cal Anthropology, Free University of Berlin, the 
extensive research carried out by Christoph Wulf 
and colleagues over more than thirty years has 
led to a new consideration of the role played by 
practical knowledge (silent or tacit knowledge) 
for the functioning of human social life and the 
dynamics of social learning (Wulf et al. [2017]). 
Indeed, in order to survive and reproduce with-
in a socio-cultural community, individuals have 
to learn the ability to act socially and to inter-
act with other members, both within and across 
social groups. This learning is not limited to (nor 
does it predominantly involve) acquiring the sym-
bolic knowledge collectively shared by the group. 
Instead, it encompasses (and involves to a much 
greater extent) the assimilation of the legacy of 
bodily practices, behavioural patterns, rules and 
schemes of action that distinguishes that group 
(Wulf [2008]). It is, in other words, a matter of 
embodied competence or practical knowledge (for 
instance: the ability to perform correctly the ritu-
als of the group or to exchange gifts). 
According to Wulf, practical knowledge can-
not, by definition, be formally taught; rather it 
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is acquired through mimetic learning process-
es. Mimetic learning (i.e., learning by imitation, 
although not in the sense of mere copying, rather 
as a productive, creative «process by which the 
act of relating to other persons and worlds in a 
mimetic way leads to an enhancement of one’s 
own world view, action, and behaviour», Wulf 
[2008]: 56) makes us able to acquire cultural com-
petence: that practical, tacit, procedural knowl-
edge required in order for a man or a woman to 
fully integrate within a cultural community. It is 
fair to say, Wulf argues, that the roots of mimetic 
processes – at the heart of human social life – are 
essentially aesthetic: mostly expressed and per-
formed in bodily arrangements, mimetic processes 
are sensuous, creative, inventive performances. As 
the German scholar remarks, without taking this 
aesthetic dimension into account, through the lens 
of which the limits of a merely functionalist view 
of culture easily emerge, many cultural practices 
could not be made intelligible. 
In line with a growing amount of studies in 
the social sciences and anthropology that, in the 
last few years, have stressed the high significance 
and fundamental role of the aesthetic dimension 
and the arts for the stabilization and functioning 
of human socio-cultural life (see Turner [1982], 
Fischer-Lichte [2008]; from an evolutionary per-
spective: see Ellen Dissanayake [1992, 2000]), 
Wulf argues that the practical-aesthetic knowledge 
acquired through mimetic behaviour contrib-
ute in a decisive way to the process of individual 
and collective identity formation. In a nutshell, 
in order to be (fully developed) Homo sapiens we 
cannot but be Homo aestheticus. 
4. HABITUAL BEHAVIOUR: A FUNDAMENTAL 
COMPONENT OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
Throughout the history of Western thought 
philosophers have considered “habitual behav-
iour” (let us provisionally use this expression, to 
be further specified in the following) as a funda-
mental component of human practical knowledge. 
Habit, hexis, habitus, consuetudo, custom, habitual-
ity, habitual knowledge are just a short selection of 
the wide range of terms expressed by the notion of 
habitual behaviour. Generally speaking, and not-
withstanding the enormous richness and diversity 
of meanings, it may be said that all these terms 
refer to a kind of ability, of embodied knowledge, 
which is “possessed” by the individual (consid-
ered either as a single person or as a member of 
the social community) and acquired after a more 
or less extended and repeated process of interac-
tion with its environment. Habitus, from the Latin 
habeo, “to have”, “to possess”, designates something 
(a competence) that is stably possessed; in the 
same vein, the Greek word hexis, from the verb 
echo, indicating having or possessing, designates a 
stable arrangement or stable disposition. 
Reflections on the cluster of concepts under 
the umbrella “habitual behaviour” (habit, hexis, 
habitus, consuetudo, custom, habituality, habitual 
knowledge) span the history of Western philoso-
phy, from ancient Greece (Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics) through to almost all schools and theo-
retical traditions until the present days, includ-
ing Michel de Montaigne, David Hume, French 
spiritualism (Félix Ravaisson), American pragma-
tism (William James and John Dewey), Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty, Marcel Mauss’ 
“techniques of the body” and, in the field of soci-
ology, Pierre Bourdieu’s investigations on the 
notion of “habitus”. To address systematically such 
a bourgeoning richness of meanings and shades 
of meanings would be clearly outside the scope of 
this paper (see Strathern [1996]; Krais, Gebauer 
[2002]; Sparrow, Hutchinson [2013]; Bernacer, 
Lombo, Murillo [2015]); I shall therefore restrict 
myself to a couple of specific remarks, mostly 
referred to contemporary research on habitual 
behaviours and habits and functional to the devel-
opment of my argument in the following para-
graphs.
In the framework of contemporary research 
on the role of habitual/practical knowledge for 
human social life, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
is a mandatory reference. Habitus, which together 
with the notions of “field” and “capital” constitutes 
one of the focal points of Bourdieu’s sociological 
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account, may be conceived of as a system for sta-
bilizing – that is, making them habitual – and for 
transmitting practices in a society. In his book The 
Logic of Practice (1980), Bourdieu argues that hab-
itus is «an acquired system of generative schemes 
[...], an infinite capacity for generating product – 
thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions» 
(Bourdieu [1980]: 53), result of the repeated expo-
sure of the individual to a certain socio-cultural 
environment. Through the individual’s habitus, 
social conditions get imprinted as a second nature 
and habitus becomes a state of the body, a bodily 
instantiation of a routine. According to Bourdieu, 
indeed, within pre-literate societies knowledge 
could only be passed down through this bod-
ily, incorporated, embodied way of transmission3. 
It is worth stressing that the notion of “habitus” 
plays, in Bourdieu’s account, also a crucial role in 
the development, stabilisation and transmission of 
aesthetic tastes and preferences (Bourdieu [1979]). 
In his sociological theory, the French social 
scientist introduces what has been called the “nat-
uralization effect”, a principle according to which, 
once social rules and schemes of action/interac-
tion have turned into habitual practices, people 
are no more fully aware of their arbitrary nature: 
they are so deeply inscribed into the individual’s 
body (habits, gestures and thinking style) that 
they end up with being performed unconsciously, 
therefore appearing innate or natural (Bourdieu 
[1980]). It is precisely because of the naturaliza-
tion effect that habitus is less subjected to rational 
analysis and to analytical, “scientific” knowledge; 
3 Although to go more into details about this topic would 
be impossible within the restricted limits of this paper, let 
me notice that, within the field of biology, epigenetics, as 
a bourgeoning, recently established discipline that focuses 
mostly on chromatin packaging modifications (induced 
by the environment) that allow differential access of 
transcriptional factors to DNA sequence, without any 
changes in this latter, has already started to demonstrate 
that memories of injustice, stratifications of power rela-
tions and conditions of mental and psychical disability 
penetrate into the body and may be passed down to the 
offspring, «telling their stories to the genetic narratives 
of each individual», see Armiero ([2017]: 53). See also 
Jablonka, Lamb (2005); Carey (2011).
as has been noted, «the power of habit lies to a 
great extent in the degree to which it remains con-
cealed» (Sparrow, Hutchinson [2013]: 157). 
Along with sociology and anthropology, we 
have recently witnessed a growing interest in 
the notions of habit and habitual behaviour also 
in the field of cognitive sciences. But it has not 
always been this way. In the 20th-century cogni-
tive sciences, dominated by the computational 
theory and the idea of mental representation as 
the key-concept to understand how the human 
mind works, the notion of habit has been mostly 
understood as a mere automatic, mechanical rou-
tine. Recently, with the increasing criticisms raised 
against the computational theory of the mind and 
with the emergence of the new paradigm of 4E 
cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, and 
enactive) (see Menary [2010]), there has been a 
re-assessment of the notion of habit, as an embed-
ded and embodied disposition of the mind. At 
least in the field of contemporary cognitive sci-
ences, habits are now understood as one of the 
cornerstones of a new conception of the human 
mind. As Alva Nöe writes: «Human beings are 
creatures of habit. Habits are central to human 
nature [...]. Only a being with habits could have a 
mind like ours» (Nöe [2009]: 97-98). Our daily life 
seems to largely rely on tacit, implicit, non-strictly 
rational, habitual knowledge (see Bargh [1997]); 
«during much of our waking lives, we act accord-
ing to our habits, from the time we rise and go 
through our morning routines until we fall asleep» 
(Graybiel [2008]: 360). 
The 2015 paper I have mentioned at the begin-
ning of this essay suggests that, when analysing 
human environmental behaviour (i.e., the way 
in which, for example, humans conceive of their 
place in nature, consume and share common 
goods and environmental resources, affect natural 
environments either by contributing to their con-
servation and safeguarding or, to the contrary, by 
harming them) we should always bear in mind 
that, like the vast majority of human behaviour, 
also environmental behaviour is largely regulat-
ed by practical knowledge, by habitual schemes 
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and patterns, habits, habitus and routines, both at 
the individual and at the collective level (see, for 
instance, Knussen, Yule [2008]). We act accord-
ing to certain dispositions or tendencies that are 
often acquired through repetition, through the 
repeated exposure to certain socio-cultural con-
ditions (Bourdieu) or through mimetic-aesthetic 
learning (Wulf); decisions, actions and judgments 
performed over the course of an individual’s life-
time keep exercising their influence (in the form 
of habitual tendencies) on what the individual 
is going to decide, do and judge in the future, 
although without any strictly deterministic “fate” 
and, what’s more, without the individual being ful-
ly aware of this influence. 
Although each community, each socio-cultural 
context, each field (to recall Bourdieu’s fundamen-
tal notion) has admittedly its own way of under-
standing, making sense of and operationalizing 
the relationship to the environment, it is fair to 
say (at least in the Western world) that a common 
thread underlies all today’s forms of habitual envi-
ronmental behaviour: a tendency to think of us, 
humans (and our place in nature), as ontologically 
separated from the environment and the other liv-
ing beings around us. «Fraught with nature/cul-
ture, human/nonhuman, man/woman, East/West, 
North/South, and ecology/economy binary oppo-
sition», this Anthropocenic binary epistemology «is 
the driving force behind economic growth, politi-
cal strategies, and technological development, with 
all their detrimental consequences on our Earth’s 
fragile equilibrium» (Oppermann, Iovino [2017]: 
4). As I have already hinted following Bourdieu, 
this tendency has been so deeply incorporated 
into the bodies, habits, routines of Western men 
and women, so strongly imprinted that it is today 
understood as something merely natural, innate, 
and therefore not to be questioned, habitual. 
Despite much excellent work carried out so 
far in the field of the environmental humanities, 
scholars examining the human factor involved 
in the current environmental crisis have not yet 
fully explored the role played by habitual prac-
tices or dispositions (habits or habitus) in human 
environmental conducts (Wilhite [2015]). Habits 
still remain a challenging and somewhat blurry 
topic: habits may be, on the one hand, personal 
and corporeal or, on the other hand, social and 
historical (habitus); there may be an amelioration, 
or improvement, of our habits over time, although 
it is widely acknowledged that the habits of indi-
viduals can be obstacles to the adoption of new 
modes of behaviour; habits may have a non-cog-
nitive, passive character, like mechanical or blind 
routines, but at the higher levels of our mental/
bodily life they can be penetrated by awareness 
and cognition (as in the case of the Aristotelian 
hexis, which is an acquired disposition to perform 
certain actions with increasing ease, cognitive 
control and success, see Bernacer, Murillo [2014]; 
Barandian, Di Paolo [2014]). 
A growing number of recent research publica-
tions, in the field of the Environmental Humani-
ties, have addressed the question as to why science 
reports, data, and scientific statistics about the cur-
rent environmental crisis have not been able yet to 
shift human attitudes and to really promote pro-
environmental conducts – the 2015 paper I have 
briefly commented on above is an example of such 
publications. On the other hand, another much 
debated topic has been in recent years the type of 
environmental narrative we should adopt, that is 
«how to tell stories [about the current environmen-
tal crisis, climate change etc.] that will not easily fit 
together in the ways we are accustomed to?» (Ber-
toni [2017]: 178), thus initiating a process of de-
familiarization and critical revision of “what we are 
accustomed to”. I am persuaded that these ques-
tions are meaningful and important, but should 
be preceded, in my view, by another one: what is, 
exactly, what we are accustomed to? Are we really 
aware of what we are accustomed to? The main idea 
of this paper is that we should turn to aesthetics in 
order to be able to fully address these problems. 
5. WHERE DO THE AESTHETIC AND THE ARTS 
FIT INTO THIS PICTURE? 
I suggest that engaging in aesthetic/artistic 
experiences may be an effective strategy to “grasp” 
our embodied habits – the habitual layer of our 
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perceptual trade with the environment – and gen-
tly lead them back to awareness. As hinted above, 
«the power of habit lies to a great extent in the 
degree to which it remains concealed [...]». Lead-
ing habits back to awareness, however, «is not to 
be understood in intellectualist terms, for no act 
of cognition is going to change one’s embodi-
ment [...] Awareness of habit has to be cultivated 
at the level of sensations, feelings, and involuntary 
thoughts [...]» (Sparrow, Hutchinson [2013]: 157). 
In other words, at the level of aisthesis, or aesthet-
ic experience.
Now, this is  not  a straightforward issue and 
would require a much more detailed analysis in 
order to be fully developed, but I shall  restrict 
myself  here to making only a few points. As a 
body of recent research has demonstrated, at 
the crossroads between aesthetics, philosophy 
of mind, cognitive sciences and neurosciences 
(Desideri [2013, 2015, 2018]; Leder, Nadal [2014]; 
Pelowski et al. [2017]; Schaeffer [2015a,b]), when 
we engage in an aesthetic experience the environ-
ment with which we interact (that is, the environ-
ment to which we draw our aesthetically inflected 
attention) is explored in a polycentric, horizontal, 
divergent way (Schaeffer [2015a]); instead of try-
ing to reduce or schematize the complexity of the 
environmental information, our aesthetic atten-
tion indulges in and dwell on this complexity; 
instead of functionalizing our cognitive and per-
ceptual dynamics (as in standard experience), we 
let, through our aesthetically inflected attention, 
these cognitive dynamics and habitual perceptual 
routines come to the foreground (Desideri [2013, 
2015]). The aesthetic experience is characterised 
by a peculiar and spontaneous synthesis of activ-
ity and passivity (although to various degrees, 
which differ from case to case): the “passive” layer 
of emotion and the “active” layer of cognition, in 
the form of a perceptual dynamics (exposed to a 
certain degree of passivity insofar as it is imbued 
with emotions) which nevertheless has the active 
power to return on itself, to reflect on itself while 
remaining emotionally loaded (in the terms of a 
reflektierte Wahrnehmung, see Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of the Power of Judgement, Introduction; 
Desideri [2011]). It is in virtue of this active/pas-
sive perceptual dynamics, I suggest, that engaging 
in aesthetic experiences may be an effective strate-
gy to “grasp” (actively) our naturalized (Bourdieu) 
– therefore not completely conscious – habitual 
tendencies, «at the level of sensations, feelings, 
and involuntary thoughts» (Sparrow, Hutchinson 
[2013]: 157).
There is a growing awareness of the potential 
of the arts and aesthetic experience for the envi-
ronmental issue: the number of projects, work-
shops and educational programs concerning the 
current environmental crisis, biodiversity, and 
climate change, organized with the cooperation 
of art educators, art practitioners and artists, is 
impressive and steadily growing. In the last few 
years, moreover, projects and events and, more in 
general, academic researchers working in the field 
seem to have started to pay attention to the sphere 
of human habitual tendencies, dispositions and 
take-for-granted assumptions, and to their role 
within an environmental education framework 
(Eernstman [2014]; Lane [2012]; Northcott [2012]; 
Brook [2012]). As Harold Wilhite argues (in a 
paper devoted to the idea of sustainable consump-
tion), «there is an urgent need for a robust theory 
of consumption that addresses how habits form, 
how they change and how policy can contribute to 
the formation of new habits that are less environ-
mentally intrusive» (Wilhite [2015]: 100). How-
ever, since «to acknowledge the power of habits 
and [...] to find ways to influence and move them» 
(ibi, 108) are two very different things, firstly we 
should address the question as to whether (and, if 
yes, how) people may become aware of their natu-
ralized environmental habits. As already hinted, 
the aesthetic and the arts seem to have much to 
say (and to do) in this respect. 
 
The question how to become aware of the 
habitual, embodied, mostly unconscious layer of 
our environmental experience seems to be even 
more urgent (and difficult to address) in today’s 
condition of technological hyper-medialization, 
both at the individual and at the collective level. 
Literally bombarded by technologically-mediated 
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stimuli (digital images, sounds, information, virtu-
al environments), which seem to alienate us from 
our “real” body – and thus from the “real” envi-
ronment within which this body is embedded – 
we are constantly exposed to the risk of losing our 
ability to judge critically, to cultivate awareness, 
to autonomously direct our attention towards this 
or that instead of being heteronomously attracted, 
fascinated, forced (Crary [2001]). How to “grasp” 
our deepest bodily habits, when the body is hyper-
mediated, endowed with technological prosthe-
ses and therefore the environment with which 
the body is supposed to interact appears distant, 
opaque, untouchable?
This is, however, only half of the story. Indeed, 
recent research in aesthetics has persuasively spo-
ken for a potentiation – not a reduction – of the 
perceptual powers of the prosthetic body, the “vir-
tual body”, in digital/virtual environments (Dioda-
to [2012, 2014, 2015]; Kluszczyńki [2010]), where 
a properly relational-interactive ontology (between 
the body and its environment) can take place, 
overcoming the nature/culture, human/nonhu-
man, organic/inorganic divide4. As mentioned in 
the first paragraph of this paper, one of the major 
merits of the Environmental Aesthetics in the 70s 
and 80s of the past century was to lead, within the 
Anglo-American philosophical tradition, to the 
recognition of a mode of aesthetic experience that 
differs from the aesthetic experience of “stand-
ard” art, being complex, immersive and multi-
sensory and addressing environments rather than 
isolated objects: today’s new digital technologies 
seem to be able to enact in the most effective way 
such an immersive, relational, complex environ-
4 As Diodato ([2014]: 60-61) argues, «The relationship 
human body-virtual body does not restrain corporeity 
giving rise to a disembodied mind-gaze [...]. On the con-
trary, the virtual environments with their “heavy” bodies 
interrelating with “thin” bodies tend to exalt the difference 
and the awareness of the difference from the usual body-
environment relationships. The user is then conscious of 
perceiving an imaginary space; he or she does not have 
the sensation of experiencing a dematerialized reality. The 
user experiences a reality felt as “other”, as different», my 
emphasis. 
mental experience, making the body even more 
aesthetically powerful in its intimate connection 
with the environment5. The implications and the 
potential of digital artistic devices, digital media, 
and virtual environments for raising awareness 
of environmental/ecological issues, of the current 
environmental crisis and of our environmental 
habitual behaviour constitute a fascinating topic, 
which has recently started to attract the attention 
of the scholarly world: the Digital Environmen-
tal Humanities (DEH), as a generative confluence 
of the environmental humanities and the digital 
humanities, are one of the latest fruits of today’s 
interdisciplinary research work for the environ-
ment (Sinclair, Posthumus [2017]). 
«The fundamental argument [...] fuelling the 
research in the environmental humanities is that 
the urgent environmental problems that stretch 
from the geological to the biological are also 
essentially social and cultural issues» (Opper-
mann, Iovino [2017]: 3): in this sense, in order to 
effectively address the current environmental crisis 
no less than a profound rethinking of our notion 
of human “nature”, including a renewed considera-
tion of the habitual layer of human experience and 
of the role of the arts and the aesthetic dimension 
for human life, is required. Aesthetics, within this 
complex and multi-faceted framework, matters: 
that’s the point from which our research should 
start. 
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